Challenge 9: Safe abstractions for core::time::Duration

• Status: Open
• Tracking Issue: #72
• Start date: 2024/08/20
• End date: 2025/04/10
• Reward: N/A

Goal

Write function contracts for core::time::Duration that can be used as safe abstractions. Even though the majority of Duration methods are safe, many of them are safe abstractions over unsafe code.

For instance, the new method is implemented as follows in v1.3.0:

pub const fn new(secs: u64, nanos: u32) -> Duration {
    if nanos < NANOS_PER_SEC {
        // SAFETY: nanos < NANOS_PER_SEC, therefore nanos is within the valid range
        Duration { secs, nanos: unsafe { Nanoseconds(nanos) } }
    } else {
        let secs = match secs.checked_add((nanos / NANOS_PER_SEC) as u64) {
            Some(secs) => secs,
            None => panic!("overflow in Duration::new"),
        };
        let nanos = nanos % NANOS_PER_SEC;
        // SAFETY: nanos % NANOS_PER_SEC < NANOS_PER_SEC, therefore nanos is within the valid range
        Duration { secs, nanos: unsafe { Nanoseconds(nanos) } }
    }
}

Success Criteria

Write a type invariant for the struct Duration. Write function contracts for the following public functions.

1. Duration::new(secs: u64, nanos: u32) -> Duration

2. Duration::from_secs(secs: u64) -> Duration

3. Duration::from_millis(millis: u64) -> Duration

4. Duration::from_micros(micros: u64) -> Duration

5. Duration::from_nanos(nanos: u64) -> Duration

6. Duration::as_secs(&self) -> u64

7. Duration::as_millis(&self) -> u128

8. Duration::as_micros(&self) -> u128

9. Duration::as_nanos(&self) -> u128

10. Duration::subsec_millis(&self) -> u32

11. Duration::subsec_micros(&self) -> u32

12. Duration::subsec_nanos(&self) -> u32

13. Duration::checked_add(&self, rhs: Duration) -> Option<Duration>

14. Duration::checked_sub(&self, rhs: Duration) -> Option<Duration>

15. Duration::checked_mul(&self, rhs: u32) -> Option<Duration>

16. Duration::checked_div(&self, rhs: u32) -> Option<Duration>

The memory safety and the contracts of the above listed functions must be verified for all possible input values.

List of UBs

In addition to any properties called out as SAFETY comments in the source code, all proofs must automatically ensure the absence of the following undefined behaviors:

• Accessing (loading from or storing to) a place that is dangling or based on a misaligned pointer.
• Reading from uninitialized memory.
• Mutating immutable bytes.
• Producing an invalid value

Note: All solutions to verification challenges need to satisfy the criteria established in the challenge book in addition to the ones listed above.